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According to a long-standing and dominant view, language is the 
product of an innate, universal, domain-specific and encapsulated 
module (Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 1994). In recent 
years, there has been a shift away from this perspective and 
researchers are questioning many of these fundamental 
assumptions (Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Hagoort & Van 
Berkum, 2007; Langacker, 1987). Increasingly, linguists are 
engaging with ideas from evolutionary biology to think about 
language evolution and language change (e.g., Dunn, Greenhill, 
Levinson, & Gray, 2011). This brings to the fore linguistic 
diversity, highlighted in a recent article by Evans and Levinson 
(2009). The idea of a single underlying linguistic system different 
only in surface realization seems increasingly unlikely.
If languages are so different from one another then we need to 
understand how and why. This gives prominence to sociolinguistics 
and linguistic anthropology. At the same time, there is ever more 
interaction between linguistics and psychology, in particular 
through the subfield of psycholinguistics. As a result, this article 
presents highlights of emotion research from the language 
sciences broadly defined, including, where relevant, insights and 
findings from these ancillary fields.
There are a number of questions regarding the interaction 
between emotion and language, each of which could be asked at 
different levels of structure, as suggested by Wilce (2009, p. 3), 
who reasons: “nearly every dimension of every language at 
least potentially encodes emotion.” Language is at the nexus of 
cognition, on the one hand, and culture on the other. It is private, 
so intertwined with thought so as to seem inseparable; yet it is 
also public, being the medium of communication. Language, 
then, is the ideal forum to examine the relationship between 
culture and cognition: How is emotion expressed in language? 
How do cultural forces shape the language of emotion? Does 
language in return impact on cognition and culture? These 
central questions are not answered in these pages, but I pose 
them to illustrate the critical role of language in emotion 
research.
It is perhaps helpful to unpack further the notion of meaning 
so as to better understand how emotion might be encoded in 
language. Linguistic meaning is complex and multifold. There 
is the referential or descriptive aspect of meaning (things in 
the world denoted by a linguistic word or form) and the 
concomitant intension (the relationships between forms, such 
as taxonymy, synonym, etc.). Forms carry connotative meaning, 
where emotion is not entailed but implied. Expressive meaning 
conveys the speaker’s feeling or attitude towards the content 
of the message, while social meaning indicates something 
about the speaker’s social role and stance (cf. Cruse, 1986; 
Lyons, 1977).
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These distinctions map (loosely) to the distinctions made 
within psychology between emotion, affect, and attitude (Barrett 
& Bliss-Moreau, 2009; McGuire, 1969; Russell, 1980). The 
descriptive meaning of emotion words is taken to refer to 
discrete states, such as “happiness,” “anger,” and “sadness.” 
Connotative meaning maps to the general dimensions of arousal 
and valence. Expressive meaning captures speakers’ attitudes or 
evaluations about a proposition. Linguists typically focus on 
one of these aspects to the exclusion of others: Cognitive 
linguists, for example, almost exclusively study reference and 
discrete emotions, while linguistic anthropologists focus on 
social meaning and use “affect” as a coverall term (Besnier, 
1990; Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004). Here, “emotion” is used as 
the superordinate term to cover the aforementioned distinctions 
(cf. Wilce, 2009).
This review outlines aspects of linguistic structure where 
emotion might reveal itself. More attention is devoted to aspects 
of “emotion and language” where previous reviews have been 
silent. I only briefly touch on prosody and lexicon. Both these 
areas have been reviewed previously, so I do not dwell on them. 
More space is devoted, instead, to topics such as sound-symbolism 
and related phenomena (e.g., interjections, ideophones), which 
hitherto have been marginalized. As the modular view of language 
dwindles, many in the language sciences have shifted from 
viewing meaning as amodal and propositional to increasingly 
“embodied,” and so these topics have become ever more 
prominent. I also highlight some aspects of grammar that are little 
considered in the context of emotion and language. Finally, some 
recent studies of emotion in the context of discourse, both in 
narrative and conversation, are discussed.
Sounds
I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and 
modification, aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the 
voices of other animals, and man’s own distinctive cries [. . .] we may 
conclude from a widely spread analogy that this power would have been 
especially exerted during the courtship of the sexes, serving to express 
various emotions, as love, jealousy, triumph, and serving as a challenge 
to their rivals. The imitation by articulate sounds of musical cries might 
have given rise to words expressive of various complex emotions. 
(Darwin, 1871, p. 56)
Darwin in this quote points to the close relationship between 
emotion and sound in evolutionary terms, a sentiment echoed 
by scholars over the years (cf. Christiansen & Kirby, 2003). 
Regardless of whether emotional expression was the original 
impetus for language evolution or not, we can nevertheless ask 
of the 6,000 or so languages spoken today: Is there evidence for 
a continuing tight link between speech sounds and emotions? To 
answer this question it is important to distinguish different 
aspects of speech sounds. There are the physical parameters 
related to a sound’s acoustic properties: how sound is produced 
physiologically and how it is perceived auditorily. Sounds vary 
in loudness, pitch, duration, length, voice quality, and so forth. 
In addition, there are those sounds—consonants and vowels—
that combine to make meaningful units, such as words, within a 
language. For any one of these speech sound parameters we 
could ask whether they are used to signal emotion.
Prosody
Prosody refers to the “structure that organizes sound”; that is, 
qualities of speech including pitch, tempo, loudness, and so on 
(Cutler, Dahan, & Van Donselaar, 1997, p. 142). Speakers raise 
their voices, speak at a higher pitch, and lengthen vowels to 
signal a particular emotion or emotional intensity (Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 2001; Jespersen, 1922; Wilce, 2009). Voice qualities, 
like harsh, tense, breathy, or whispery, can likewise indicate 
emotional state (Gobl & Ní Chasaide, 2003). In Zapotec, a lan-
guage spoken in Mexico, speakers use different phonation types 
to mark different speech registers: Speaking with a high pitch 
falsetto indicates respect; using a breathy voice demonstrates 
authority; while a creaky voice seeks commiseration (Sicoli, 
2010). Here, sound features index social roles. Although it has 
been suggested that speaking louder, at higher pitch, and so 
forth, heralds greater depth of feeling, in everyday conversation 
there are complex cues and dynamics at play, making it unlikely 
that loudness, for example, always signals greater intensity 
(Barth-Weingarten, Reber, & Selting, 2010).
Experimental evidence suggests that speakers can recognize 
discrete emotions from paralinguistic features across spoken 
languages (e.g., Pell, Monetta, Paulmann, & Kotz, 2009; Pell, 
Paulmann, Dara, Alasseri, & Kotz, 2009; Scherer, Banse, & 
Wallbott, 2001; Thompson & Balkwill, 2006) as well as sign 
languages (Hietanen, Leppänen, & Lehtonen, 2004; Reilly, 
Mcintire, & Seago, 1992). For example, Pell, Monetta, 
Paulmann, & Kotz (2009) played Spanish, English, German, 
and Arabic recordings of “pseudo-utterances” (i.e., utterances 
without semantic content) to Spanish participants who had to 
decide which emotion was being expressed: anger, disgust, fear, 
sadness, joy, or neutral. Recognition rates by Spanish speakers 
were significantly above chance for all four languages. This 
study, and the others cited earlier, are suggestive of cross- 
cultural recognition of specific emotions; but many of these 
articles compare languages that are closely related (typically 
Indo-European languages) or share other linguistic characteris-
tics (for example, English and Chinese both have subject verb 
object [SVO] word order and are morphologically more ana-
lytic; Comrie, 1981). These shared characteristics urge caution 
in the face of claims such as “vocal expressions of the emotions 
investigated [. . .] contain invariant or ‘modal’ elements which 
are universally exploited by speakers and can be decoded across 
languages irrespective of the linguistic ability and experience of 
the listener” (Pell, Monetta, Paulmann, & Kotz, 2009, p. 116).
It is important to consider the relevant cross-linguistic facts. 
The “same” paralinguistic features can play different roles 
across languages. Take pitch, for example: In English pitch is 
implicated in word stress and thus can help disambiguate nouns 
from verbs (e.g., PERmit vs. perMIT), while lexical-tone 
languages use pitch to distinguish between words. Indeed, when 
expressing emotion, pitch is less important in Chinese, a lexical 
tone language, and instead speech rate is more relevant (Anolli, 
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Wang, Mantovani, & De Toni, 2008). Pitch can also signal 
phrase boundaries, yes–no questions, and other pragmatic 
information. So, a child or second-language learner must learn 
to parcel out language-specific functions of pitch in order to 
tune into the emotion-relevant ones. This takes time to figure 
out (Friend, 2000; Quam & Swingley, 2012).
One other pertinent detail relating to the aforementioned 
studies on emotion and prosody is that they typically use enacted 
or posed materials. Future research will have to bridge the gap 
between how speakers display emotions in everyday conversation 
and how they simulate them when told to produce them on 
demand in experimental settings. Finally, it is regrettable that 
many studies in this area do not report the language background 
of their participants; bilingualism is potentially a serious issue 
for interpreting results. For reviews of recent literature on 
emotion and prosody, see Russell, Bachorowski, and Fernández-
Dols (2003) and Scherer, Clark-Polner, and Mortillaro (2011).
Phonetics and Phonology
What about phonemes, the vowels and consonants of a 
language? Do these reliably signal specific emotions? Most 
linguists would answer no. The arbitrary relationship between 
the sound of a word and its meaning is taken to be a defining 
feature of language. Human languages exhibit “duality of 
patterning”: meaningless sounds are combined to make 
meaningful words (Hockett, 1960).
For any language, we can identify those speech sounds 
which constitute its phonological inventory; that is, minimal 
sounds that distinguish between words. For example, /p/ and /b/ 
are two phonemes in English which distinguish the words pin 
and bin. Establishing a language’s phonology is not as 
straightforward as it initially appears since speakers realize the 
same speech sound in different ways. For example, in most 
varieties of English the sound /t/ is pronounced differently when 
it is at the beginning of a word (e.g., top) than when it is in the 
middle of word (e.g., butter), but they are nevertheless the same 
from the perspective of a native English speaker. In top, t is 
pronounced with a slight burst of air [th] (whereas in stop it 
isn’t). In my native dialect, the t in butter is pronounced with a 
glottal stop [ʔ], produced by transiently stopping airflow in the 
vocal tract. These pronunciation variants are all allophones of 
/t/, but in another language they could be distinct phonemes in 
their own right (as they are, for example, in Hindi). By following 
a series of comparisons, a linguist can identify the total set of 
phonemes within a language.
Across the world, the inventory size of phonemes varies 
considerably: Rotokas (spoken in Papua New Guinea) has only 
six consonants, whereas !Xóõ (spoken in Botswana), at the other 
extreme, is reported to have 122 consonants. Like other Khoisan 
languages, !Xóõ utilizes contrasting click sounds as part of its 
phonological inventory. On average, languages have a modest 
inventory of around 20 consonants (Maddieson, 2011a; see also 
Robinson, 2006). Vowels show a smaller range of variation. The 
smallest number of vowels in a language is two (the language 
Yimas of Papua New Guinea), the largest 14 (German), with an 
average of six across languages (Maddieson, 2011b).
This variation speaks to the essential arbitrariness of sound-
meaning associations, suggesting it is implausible that specific 
sounds are associated with specific emotional meaning. 
However, there are those that do argue for a tighter link between 
sounds and emotions than this standard view holds. The linguist 
Jespersen, for example, argued:
If grumble comes to mean the expression of a mental state of 
dissatisfaction, the connection between the sound of the word and its 
sense is even more direct, for the verb is imitative of the sound produced 
by such moods, cf. mumble and grunt, gruntle. The name of Mrs. 
Grundy is not badly chosen as a representative of narrow-minded 
conventional morality. A long list might be given of symbolic expressions 
for dislike, disgust or scorn. (1922, p. 26, italics in original)
Within literary studies many have likewise noted correspond-
ences between sounds and emotion. Fónagy (1961), for example, 
compared aggressive and tender poems by the Hungarian poet 
Petöfi and found that /t/, /k/, and /r/ were more frequent in 
aggressive poems, while /l/, /m/, and /n/ were more frequent in 
tender poems. Masson (1953), when considering various 
European poets, argued that /o/, /l/, /m/, and /w/ suggest liquidity, 
softness, and coolness. Likewise, Tsur (1992) suggests /l/ is liq-
uid, periodic, and soothing. In the last decade or more, there have 
been attempts to test these posited associations statistically. For 
example, Whissell (1999) transcribed poetry, song lyrics, adver-
tisements, and various types of popular fiction into a phonemic 
transcript and then tested whether certain categories of pho-
nemes appear more often in particular genres. Independently, she 
calculated the emotional tone of each text by averaging the 
pleasantness and activation scores of words that also appear in 
the “Dictionary of Affect in Language” (see Whissell, 1989). 
Using this procedure, Whissell found a number of associations 
between categories of phonemes (e.g., bilabial consonants, /m/, 
/p/, /b/) and emotion (e.g., aggressiveness), through the higher 
than chance appearance of those phonemes in certain genres 
(e.g., Zeppelin lyrics, boy’s advertisements). Using a similar 
approach, Whissell (2003) found that texts with more /i/ pho-
nemes tend to be more pleasant, while those with /I/ phonemes 
were more active.
More recently, Auracher, Albers, Zhai, Gareeva, and 
Stavniychuk (2010) tested the cross-cultural validity of these 
emotional sound-symbolic associations. Auracher et al. selected 
a number of poems from German, Russian, Ukranian, and 
Chinese and calculated the ratio of plosives (e.g., /p/) to nasals 
(e.g., /n/) in each poem. They then selected the poem with the 
highest and lowest ratios in each language and asked native 
speakers to rate those poems on a number of parameters, 
including happiness, arousal, aggression, and melancholy. 
Across languages, they found an association between consonants 
and emotionality which they state “clearly suggests there is a 
universal tendency to express happy and active feelings with 
plosive sounds, whereas sad and passive feelings are encoded in 
nasal sounds” (Auracher et al., 2010, p. 21).
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In an independent line of inquiry, Zajonc and colleagues 
(McIntosh, Zajonc, Vig, & Emerick, 1997; Zajonc, Murphy, & 
Inglehart, 1989) argue that facial feedback whilst producing 
vowels causes distinct emotion states. They focus, in particular, 
on the German vowel ü, /y/, which they claim “constricts the 
nostrils, and pushes the mouth and brows forward, as in a scowl” 
(McIntosh et al., 1997, p. 177). In a number of studies, Zajonc 
and colleagues tested Americans and Germans for pleasantness 
and mood after uttering the vowel itself or when embedded 
multiple times within a story. In line with their prediction, they 
found that participants had lower pleasantness and mood 
ratings when they produced ü than any other vowel. Overall, 
these studies point to the same conclusion: There are robust 
sound–emotion correspondences, which are likely universal.
There are, however, a number of problematic points that hold 
across these studies. In general, when texts are compared for 
associations between sounds and emotions they differ on a 
number of parameters, aside from the test phoneme, including 
length, rhyme, frequency of non-critical phonemes, and so 
forth. These confounding elements make it difficult to interpret 
the results unambiguously. In addition, the studies do not take 
into consideration the fact that words do not appear independently 
of each other; rather, when discussing a certain topic, keywords 
are likely to reappear, thus inflating calculations of the relative 
frequency of letters/phonemes and their likely association with 
emotions. Where statistical tests have been conducted, they are 
numerous with no correction for multiple comparisons.
Zajonc et al.’s studies are exemplary in experimental control, 
but the underlying premise of these studies is highly dubious. It 
is claimed that the same muscles involved in the production of 
/y/, such as the corrugator muscle, are also implicated in 
negative emotions. However, the only reason articulation of /y/ 
would involve frowning is if participants found it difficult to 
produce, which is quite plausible since the participants in these 
studies were either English monolinguals or English–German 
bilinguals. English does not have a phoneme /y/ and English 
speakers find it notoriously hard to produce. For native 
monolingual Germans, /y/ does not involve the corrugator 
muscle, nor does it entail constriction of the nostrils (Von Essen, 
1979). There has been no test of the greater negativity of ü with 
native monolingual speakers of German, so we do not know 
whether the posited sound–emotion association exists.
To date, the most convincing study of a possible universal 
association between sounds and emotions has been conducted 
by Taylor and Taylor (1965). They constructed nonsense words 
in four unrelated languages—English, Japanese, Korean, and 
Tamil—using sounds that were common (as far as possible) to 
all languages. Monolingual participants then judged the words 
for pleasantness. The main result of this study was that sound–
emotion associations were language-specific: Within a language 
community people were consistent in their pleasantness ratings 
of sounds, but pleasant sounds were different across languages 
(see also Iwasaki, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2007a, 2007b).
Other evidence also hints at language-specific sound–
meaning pairings. In English, words beginning with gl-, such as 
glitter, glow, gleam, glisten, and so on, all relate to “vision” and 
“light”; words beginning with sn-, snore, snarl, snort, sniff, and 
so on, relate to “nose” and “mouth,” and speakers are sensitive 
to this relationship (Bergen, 2004). Frequent English verbs are 
more likely to have front vowels, whereas frequent nouns are 
more likely to have back vowels; speakers categorize words 
faster as nouns or verbs if they obey this regularity (Sereno, 
1994). There may be such regularities in emotion words too: 
Sneer, leer, jeer, for example, all share the final -eer, and Bergen 
(2004) proposes -eer means “expression of contempt.” Future 
studies will determine whether speakers are sensitive to these 
sorts of language-specific sound–emotion regularities.
Words
When thinking about “language and emotion,” the lexicon is 
most salient; that is, words denoting or referring to emotions, 
for example angry, happy, and sad. Considerable work has 
focused on emotion lexicons, most notably by Wierzbicka and 
her colleagues (Enfield & Wierzbicka, 2002; Harkins & 
Wierzbicka, 2001; Wierzbicka, 1996, 1999). Both micro-level 
studies, focusing on specific words (see Ogarkova, in press, for 
further references), and macro-level comparisons of whole 
lexicons (e.g., Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006; Moore, Romney, 
Hsia, & Rusch, 1999; Toivonen et al., 2012) have been 
conducted in several languages, using a variety of methods (see 
Boster, 2005, for a critical review). Where differences have 
emerged, researchers have asked what the concomitant 
differences in non-linguistic cognition might be (Breugelmans 
& Poortinga, 2006; Sauter, LeGuen, & Haun, 2011; see also 
Roberson, Damjanovic, & Kikutani, 2010). These studies are 
not discussed further; instead I focus on emerging trends in 
emotion lexicon research.
Interjections
Interjections are little words expressing emotional or mental 
states that can stand alone as an utterance and, under usual 
circumstances, do not combine to form a construction with 
other word classes (Ameka, 1992). Examples are Wow!, Ah!, 
Oh!, Gee!, and Oops! According to Goffman (1981, p. 99), “We 
see such ‘expression’ as a natural overflowing, a flooding up of 
previously contained feeling, a bursting of normal restraints, a 
case of being caught off guard,” or, rather, “[t]hat is what would 
be learned by asking the man in the street if he uses these forms 
and, if so, what he means by them.”
In a novel study, Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, and Scott (2010) 
tested whether speakers of Himba, a small-scale speech 
community resident in Namibia, could recognize vocal 
expressions of emotion from speakers of English, resident in the 
United Kingdom, and vice versa. Sauter et al. presented 
participants with short stories and then asked them to indicate 
which of two vocalizations best fit the story. They found 
speakers were able to assign appropriate vocalizations to stories, 
even when they came from the non-familiar language. Although 
the speech sounds were characterized by the authors as “non-
verbal,” many could be classified as interjections. In the past, 
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linguists also considered interjections as direct outpourings of 
emotion or on the fringes of language (e.g., Jakobson, 1960), 
but today they are widely accepted as clearly linguistic tokens 
(Kockelman, 2003). Interjections vary cross-culturally in form 
(Wierzbicka, 1992). Jespersen (1922, p. 415) makes a charming 
reference to a Kipling story in this regard: “That man is no 
Afghan, for they weep ‘Ai! Ai!’ Nor is he of Hindustan, for they 
weep ‘Oh! Ho!’ He weeps after the fashion of the white men, 
who say, ‘Ow! Ow!’.”
Within a language, interjections tend to be phonologically 
anomalous, often containing sounds and sound sequences not 
found in other parts of the lexicon. They are morphologically 
unusual: They do not partake of inflections or derivations 
applicable to other word classes; on occasion they do display 
morphology; they do not obey agreement rules, and so on. Their 
semantics have also been argued to vary considerably across 
languages (Wierzbicka, 1992; Wilkins, 1992). They are likely to 
be a word class in all languages of the world (Ameka, 1992).
In this context, Sauter et al.’s study raises a number of 
interesting questions. The fact that Himba and English speakers 
were able to correctly categorize interjections from each others’ 
languages suggests that some aspect of emotional meaning is 
interpretable cross-culturally. This is potentially at odds with 
the attested variation in meaning suggested elsewhere. 
Wierzbicka (1992), for example, notes that Greek feu is an 
interjection of grief and anger, while the almost identical 
English phew signals relief. It is unclear, however, whether 
Sauter et al.’s findings are due to participants recognizing the 
phonological forms (as a result of “universal” sound-symbolism, 
perhaps) or whether participants were responding to the 
paralinguistic cues (i.e., prosody). Speakers can clearly read 
different emotional meanings from the same interjection, 
depending on prosody. Couper-Kuhlen (2011) shows, for 
example, that the “surprise” token oh, produced with low 
volume, low pitch, breathy intonation, and weak articulation, 
can indicate disappointment, whereas when produced at a high 
pitch, with high volume and sharp voice quality, it can signal 
anger. Nevertheless, it could be argued that, in both cases, oh 
also expresses that something unexpected occurred. So, future 
work will need to distinguish between these different channels 
of expression.
As stated earlier, interjections have been said to occur in all 
languages, but it is not known whether the types are also the 
same across languages and, if so, what internal states they 
express, if any (cf. Kockelman, 2003; Wharton, 2003). 
Interjections also bring out a number of thorny issues in 
linguistic theory: If interjections are stored in the lexicon, then 
how do we account for their unusual phonology? How are 
verbless, nounless utterances handled by grammar? What is the 
distribution of labor between semantics and pragmatics? This 
word class is ripe for further investigation.
Ideophones
Ideophones, like interjections, are an unusual class of words. 
Dingemanse (2011) characterizes them as “marked words that 
depict sensory imagery”: they are unusual in their sound 
patterns, morphology, and grammatical behavior and seem to be 
designed precisely so as to express inner experience. Take 
gbadara-gbadara, an ideophone from the language Siwu, 
spoken in eastern Ghana. Dingemanse suggests that, while its 
paraphrase “walking unevenly and out of balance” merely 
describes a gait, gbadara-gbadara depicts it by vividly conjuring 
a sensory image to mind. This depictive property sets ideophones 
apart from interjections. Whereas interjections are tied to the 
here-and-now and are immediate responses to perceptions (e.g., 
ouch said on touching something hot), ideophones, instead, can 
be used at any time to depict and describe (Dingemanse, 2011).
Ideophones—sometimes also called expressives or 
mimetics—are commonly found in far-flung, unrelated languages 
across the globe; Indo-European languages seem aberrant for 
missing this word class (Diffloth, 1972; Nuckolls, 1999). The 
fact that they are found in the majority of the world’s languages 
calls for exegesis.
The precise semantic domains expressed by ideophones vary 
between languages, be it size, texture, movement, color, and so on. 
Japanese ideophones seem particularly rich in expressing inner 
states. Oda (2000) provides some examples: doki doki ‘excited,’ 
hiya hiya ‘being nervously fearful of (the outcome),’ noro noro 
‘sluggish,’ odo odo ‘being shy and timid,’ and so on. His collection 
includes 1,600 ideophones, which is apparently only scratching 
the surface (Imai, Kita, Nagumo, & Okada, 2008).
Osaka and Osaka (2005) have found that Japanese speakers 
listening to laughter ideophones, such as ghera-ghera, kusu-
kusu, and nitah-nitah, show greater activation of striatal reward 
centers than when listening to non-words, suggesting the same 
neural circuits involved in experiencing humor are recruited in 
understanding the meaning of laughter words. Japanese mothers 
use ideophones frequently in child-directed speech, and they 
appear to be of special value in language learning (Imai et al., 
2008; Iwasaki et al., 2007a, 2007b). It is unknown, however, 
whether ideophones elicit greater “imagery” or “resonance” 
than other word classes with similar meanings. What is clear, in 
any case, is that ideophones ought to be of special interest to 
emotion researchers. In some languages the main function of 
ideophones is to depict emotion; when their core meaning lies 
elsewhere, they nevertheless have strong emotional connotation; 
and they play a special role in creating emotional alignment 
between speaker and hearer.
Metaphor
As the previous sections illustrate, emotion lexicons are 
incredibly rich across languages. Words and phrases do not exist 
as isolated entities, however, but form interconnected networks. 
One such supra-lexical structure is metaphor. A burgeoning 
literature within cognitive linguistics explores emotion 
metaphors, such as ANGER IS HEAT (e.g., Kövecses, 2003; 
Lakoff, 1987). These analyses have led to the provocative 
proposal that linguistic metaphors are cognitively real. Indeed, 
English speakers presented with anger-related words judge 
temperatures as higher (Wilkowski, Meier, Robinson, Carter, & 
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Feltman, 2009) and “see” red (Fetterman, Robinson, Gordon, & 
Elliot, 2011), consistent with their language metaphors.
Metaphors such as ANGER IS HEAT have been presumed to 
be grounded in universal perception and physiology. However, 
Geeraerts (2006) argues that these metaphors are the result of 
historical cultural schema. He claims that the ancient humoral 
theory of medicine permeates contemporary lexicons of English 
and related languages, as exemplified by words like bilious 
‘angry, irascible, hot-tempered’ and zwartgalling ‘sad, depressed 
(literally black-bilious)’ in Dutch. Imbalance of the humors can 
explain a number of pervasive emotion metaphors, according to 
his analysis. Moreover, the humoral account of metaphor would 
predict why physiological effects parallel to anger when 
accompanying other emotions, such as shame (i.e., face-
flushing, the subjective experience of increased temperature), 
do not lead to parallel metaphorical expressions. That is, we do 
not have expressions in English like his blood boiled with shame 
or she was fuming with shame (although, contra to Geeraerts’ 
claims, English does have expressions such as her face burnt 
with shame). This account requires further diachronic linguistic 
work. Some historical analysis shows that emotion terms 
frequently arise from concrete verbs: worry, originally meaning 
‘strangle, seize by the throat,’ preoccupy ‘seize beforehand,’ 
stun ‘deprive of consciousness with a blow,’ fascinate ‘cast a 
spell over,’ and so on (Haspelmath, 2001, p. 79). However, 
whether these changes can be motivated by cultural schema is 
unknown.
Geeraert’s analysis also raises the question of the variability 
of metaphors across cultures. Although assertions of universality 
are commonly found in the metaphor literature, the data on 
which these claims are based are rather slim: a few observations 
from a handful of WEIRD communities (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), while neglecting 95% of humanity (Arnett, 
2008). Current studies focus almost exclusively on European 
languages, with known contact and common descent, and a few 
other major world languages, such as Chinese and Japanese. But 
there are known confounds in sampling only large languages 
(e.g., Lupyan & Dale, 2010; Trudgill, 2011). In one study of a 
small endangered language, we find that speakers of Tsou 
(around 4,500 people living in the highlands of Taiwan) rarely 
make use of emotion metaphors. Metaphors such as FEAR IS A 
NATURAL FORCE (e.g., she was engulfed by panic) and 
FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (e.g., the sight filled him 
with fear) simply do not exist in the language (Huang, 2002). 
More such careful and detailed case studies are essential.
Finally, in other domains where cross-linguistic variation in 
metaphor has been attested, for example, in vocabulary for sounds 
(e.g., Eitan & Timmers, 2010; Shayan, Ozturk, & Sicoli, 2011), we 
find accompanying variation in non-linguistic conceptualizations 
(Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2011). Whether the 
same holds for emotion remains to be seen in coming years.
Other Aspects of the Lexicon
If a language has a sizeable adjective class—which not all 
languages do—then emotions will feature there, along with 
perceptions, appraisals, and so forth (Dixon, 2006). But, of 
course, emotions can be expressed in many different ways. For 
example, in Totonac, spoken in Mexico, emotion roots are 
verbs, which are turned into nouns by a morphological process 
and augmented with the instrumental applicative li:-, resulting 
in a meaning of ‘that causes the emotion expressed by V;’ for 
example, the intransitive verb ma:xanán ‘s/he is ashamed’ 
becomes li:ma:caná ‘that causes shame, shameful’ (see 
contributions in Dixon & Aikhenvald, 2006, for examples of 
how other languages code emotions).
In English, “fear” can be a noun (a terrible fear struck his 
heart), adjective (he was afraid), adverb (John was fearful for 
his life) or verb (John feared Mary). Even within the same word 
class different forms can be chosen. Compare John fears Mary 
versus John frightens Mary. These different verbs carry different 
implications. When asked who is the cause of the event, 
causation is attributed to John in John frightens Mary but to 
Mary in John fears Mary (Brown & Fish, 1983). Participants 
look for causes when reading John respects Mary (where respect 
functions as a verb), but consequences after reading about 
the identical scenario but now presented in a ditransitive 
construction, John gave respect to Mary (where respect now 
functions as a noun; Majid, Sanford, & Pickering, 2007).
Choice of verb can impact judgments of how long an event 
lasts, how much information can be inferred about the subject 
and the situation, whether the event is deemed verifiable or 
disputable, and so on (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Verbs of 
emotional expression (e.g., to smile, to frown) elicit more 
activation of the corresponding facial muscles than do adjectives 
associated with those expressions (e.g., funny, annoying), even 
when verbs and adjectives are matched for valence (Foroni & 
Semin, 2009). These examples serve to illustrate the myriad 
ways in which emotion terms are lexicalized, each with their 
own subtle consequences for conceptualization and thinking.
It is unknown at present whether these within-language 
effects are mirrored across languages; that is, do languages 
which differ systematically in whether they encode emotions as 
adjectives, nouns, or verbs show correspondingly different 
habitual patterns of thinking? Wierzbicka (2009) suggests that 
English speakers, who use adjectives more frequently to code 
emotions, conceptualize emotions as states but Russian 
speakers, who use verbs, conceptualize them as activities 
instead. Huang (2002) makes a different kind of prediction. He 
proposes that Tsou lacks emotion metaphors because emotions 
are expressed as verbs in the language. According to him, 
coding emotions as nouns reifies them and makes them objects, 
which is not the case if a language codes them as verbs. The 
reification promotes metaphorical mappings, making them 
more abundant. These ideas could easily be tested in future 
cross-linguistic research.
Grammar
Individual words behave in certain ways according to the 
grammar of the language. For example, kiss in English can take 
the plural morpheme -(e)s when it functions as a noun (e.g., 
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Mark gave Sarah three kisses), but combines with different 
morphemes, such as the past -ed, when it functions as a verb 
(e.g., Mark kissed Sarah). Morphemes are the smallest 
meaningful units in a language and can be either free, like kiss, 
or bound, like -(e)s and -ed, where they can only occur in 
conjunction with other morphemes. In the next section I present 
two case studies of emotion in morphology. Beyond the 
morpheme, there are principles structuring how words combine 
to form sentences. The section on Syntax describes some of the 
special machinery involved in handling emotion.
Morphology
Many languages have bound morphemes, or affixes, which 
literally mean “small” but which additionally convey a range of 
meanings, including sympathy, endearment, intimacy, playfulness, 
and so forth. In general, diminutives mark positive evaluation of 
the object to which the form refers. Augmentatives, the opposite of 
diminutives, convey instead emotional distance or negative stance 
(Silverstein, 2001). A recent study on the acquisition of diminutives 
by Spanish-speaking children in Peru suggests that these pragmatic 
meanings may not be acquired until relatively late (King & Melzi, 
2004), but the precise developmental trajectories for acquiring 
the various meanings of diminutives and augmentatives are not 
known.
In Lakhota, a Siouan Language of North America, there is a 
set of clitics which have been characterized as indicating both 
the gender of the speaker and specific speech acts. So, for 
example, a woman’s opinion is stereotypically marked with the 
clitic le and a man’s with lo; a woman marks something as 
surprising by using mą, while a man uses wą, and so forth 
(Trechter, 1999). Clitics can be flexibly juxtaposed to create 
certain effects. For example, Trechter describes an older man 
arriving home to find his 3-year-old nephew playing on his 
stoop. He exclaims his surprise and pleasure by declaring: 
Wąlewą hiyu wele “Oh m., look who’s come f.” In this utterance, 
the surprise particle at the beginning is marked as masculine, 
but the clitic at the end is marked feminine. Trechter argues that, 
because women are deemed more experienced dealing with 
children, women’s register is considered nurturing and 
affectionate. By using the feminine-marked clitic, the man is 
implying that he himself is nurturing.
Surprise is often coded grammatically across the world’s 
languages. Known as the “mirative” in linguistics, this category 
expresses that something is unexpected to the speaker. It is 
expressed morphologically in some languages—as in Lakhota—
while in others it appears as a grammaticalized construction 
(Delancey, 1997). Other “basic” emotions, such as fear, disgust, 
or anger, appear not to receive this sort of treatment in grammar.
Syntax
As indicated earlier in the section on metaphor, emotion verbs 
often start out with concrete meanings and gradually come to 
acquire emotion meanings. When these verbs have concrete 
meanings they behave like normal transitive verbs. But as they 
lose their original concrete meanings these verbs also change 
their grammatical behavior, leading to a different type of 
marking of the grammatical subject (Haspelmath, 2001). Verbs 
of emotion, along with those of perception and cognition (called 
psych-verbs or psych-predicates in the linguistics literature), 
stand out in their grammatical encoding. Although emotion 
receives special treatment, it often does not get singled out as 
distinct from other sorts of subjective states, such as desiring, 
wanting, cognizing, and so forth. This conflation between 
emotion and other internal states has been noted frequently in 
discussions about the lexicon, but is less noted with regards to 
their grammatical treatment (although see Wierzbicka, 1988).
In standard average European languages the prevalent and 
“canonical” way to describe emotions is to use an agent-like 
experiencer construction where the verb is treated like a typical 
transitive predicate; that is, the experiencer is marked as a 
subject and the stimulus is marked as if it were an object; for 
example, John hates cats. Other constructions carry different 
implications and suggest different construals of emotion. In the 
dative-experiencer construction the experiencer is marked with 
dative case and the stimulus now functions like a subject, for 
example, French Ce livre lui plaît, ‘This book is pleasing to 
him.’ A third type of construction, the patient-like construction, 
treats the experiencer as an object and the stimulus as a subject, 
for example, This problem worries me (Haspelmath, 2001).
Choice of construction can change the interpretation of a 
sentence from physical state to subjective state instead, as 
illustrated in this Icelandic example: Mig kelur (first person + 
singular + accusative is freezing) ‘I am freezing/getting frost-
bitten,’ with accusative marking, is interpreted as referring to 
the physiological state of coldness, while Mer kolnar (first 
person + singular + dative is getting cold) ‘I am getting cold,’ 
with dative marking, is interpreted as referring to the 
psychological experience (cited in Onishi, 2001). In South 
Asian languages, like Bangla (spoken in Bangladesh), feelings 
are encoded as the grammatical subject in impersonal 
constructions, with the verb lag- ‘strike.’ The experiencer is 
often left implicit; if it is expressed at all it takes dative case, for 
example terror strikes (me) (Klaiman, 1980; Wilce, 2009). It 
has been suggested when this construction is used that the 
experiencer is being construed as a location (Landau, 2009), the 
person is merely the recipient of the emotion, that is that the 
emotion comes to them (e.g., Lindholm, 1975), and that the 
emotion is less volitional (Klaiman, 1980). This raises the 
linguistic relativity question once again: Do speakers of 
languages like Bangla conceptualize emotions as moving 
towards them or as being less under their control? No one has 
tested these predictions independently of language.
Japanese has an intriguing restriction in how emotional 
states can be talked about: Only one’s own psychological states 
can be reported directly. That is, feelings, desires, mental 
activities, and so on, can be expressed with a first-person subject 
(i.e., I), but not with second- or third-person subjects (e.g., you 
or John). Here, the grammar–lexicon interface reflects that 
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while I can have direct access to my own subjective feelings, I 
cannot have direct access to anyone else’s emotions or thoughts. 
So, while it is perfectly acceptable to say Watashi wa kanashi-i 
‘I am sad,’ it is not acceptable to say Haha was kanashi-i ‘My 
mother is sad.’ This second sentence can only be interpreted to 
mean that the mother is the source of the feeling, that is ‘My 
mother makes me sad.’ To talk about another’s subjective states, 
you have to be explicit about the indirect nature of your 
information, by using terms such as -garu ‘shows signs of,’ rasii 
‘seems,’ soo da ‘looks as if,’ or otherwise indicating that the 
information is not directly accessible (Hasegawa & Hirose, 
2005; Shibatani, 1990).
Body parts, usually internal organs, are often thought to be 
the seat of emotions (Enfield & Wierzbicka, 2002; Yu, 2003). In 
Yélî Dnye, a language spoken on Rossel Island in Papua New 
Guinea, the seat of emotion is the throat/neck. Variation in case 
marking differentially indicates positive versus negative 
emotions. The locative form of the word for throat, nódo ‘at the 
throat,’ collocates with both positive and negative affect 
expressions, while the absolutive form, nuu ‘throat,’ collocates 
with expressions of positive affect. Compare Yi kópu a nódo ka 
t:a ‘I feel bitter about it’ (literally, ‘That thing is hanging at my 
neck’) to A nuu u tpile ‘A thing I really like’ (literally, ‘My 
throat its thing;’ Levinson, 2006).
Le Guen (2009) notes that specific emotions can receive 
distinct grammatical treatment. In Yucatec Maya, for example, 
‘to love (someone)’ has different grammatical coding from ‘to 
like;’ the former is used in a passive construction without aspect, 
but with a change in transitivity. Little is known about the extent 
to which discrete emotions receive differential grammatical 
coding across languages.
Affect-laden terms, such as damn, bloody, and fuck, are also 
interesting with respect to their grammatical behavior. For one 
thing, they challenge classical theories of meaning since they 
do not alter the truth-conditional meaning of the phrase to 
which they attach. In the sentence The handlers stole my pink 
iPod, the sentence is true if, and only if, the baggage handlers 
stole my pink iPod, but would be false if they stole my blue 
iPod instead. But in The handlers stole my damn iPod, damn 
does not modify iPod; the sentence is true if the baggage 
handlers steal an iPod of mine, whatever its characteristics. 
Rather than modifying iPod, damn conveys the speaker’s 
attitude of vexation (Potts et al., 2009; Pullum & Rawlins, 
2007). It is also not clear how to characterize the syntax of 
affect-laden expressions, like Fuck you. Perhaps Fuck you is 
just a second-person imperative like Close the door: both lack 
an overt grammatical subject. However, various grammatical 
tests show this is not the case. Imperatives, like Close the door, 
can be embedded in a number of other constructions: I said to 
close the door; Don’t close the door; Go close the door, and so 
on. But Fuck you cannot: *I said to fuck you; *Don’t fuck you; 
*Go fuck you, and so forth (Zwicky, Salus, Binnick, & Vanek, 
1971; see also Pinker, 2007).
This section does not even begin to do justice to the richness 
of grammatical encoding of emotions and other internal states. 
For a recent overview of related phenomena from a cross-
linguistic perspective see Verhoeven (2007, Chapter 3).
Discourse
At the beginning of this article, I raised the issue of sound 
symbolism for emotions in the context of isolated sounds. 
Arguably, it is not a single sound that gives rise to an emotional 
effect, but rather a sound in the context of a stretch of discourse. 
As Miall (2001, p. 69) states, “the specific qualities that emerge 
from the array of phonemes in a text depend on the contrasts 
offered by the text.” Through sound-play, metaphor, and 
repetition, a literary author can invoke a certain emotional impact 
on the reader. This highlights the fact that emotion can be inferred 
from larger stretches of narrative. In this section, some aspects of 
emotion in the context of narrative comprehension and during 
conversation are considered.
Discourse Comprehension
Understanding the emotional significance of events in narrative 
is crucial for understanding characters and motivations, and can 
help explain key plot moments (Oatley, 1992). There can be 
references to emotion in conversations of characters, portrayals 
of facial expressions and movements, and descriptions of 
actions resulting from an emotional episode. In written texts we 
can get into the minds of characters, allowing us to overhear 
thought processes, which may align readers with protagonists 
and evoke empathy (Burke, 2010). (In this context it is 
interesting to note that, although Japanese does not allow 
reporting of others’ internal states, in novels Japanese authors 
write as if they had privileged access to protagonist’s mental 
states and report them directly.) All of this suggests tight links 
between emotion systems and language processing systems 
(Sanford & Emmott, in press).
Emotions can be inferred from discourse, even when they are 
not explicitly mentioned. For example, Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, 
and Robertson (1992, p. 96) gave readers stories, such as:
Paul had always wanted his brother, Luke, to be good in baseball. So 
Paul had been coaching Luke after school for almost two years. In the 
beginning, Luke’s skills were very rough. But after hours and hours of 
coaching, Paul could see great improvement. In fact, the improvement 
had been so great that at the end of the season, at the Little League 
Awards Banquet, Luke’s name was called out to receive the Most 
Valuable Player Award.
Participants then read a sentence describing an emotional state 
congruent with that implied in the preceding passage (e.g., “It 
would be weeks before Paul’s pride would subside”) or one that 
was incongruent (e.g., “It would be weeks before Paul’s guilt 
would subside”). Readers were faster reading the sentence with 
the congruent emotional state, suggesting they had inferred it 
during reading. Recent studies question whether readers really do 
make inferences of specific emotions, such as pride and guilt 
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(Gygax, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2004; Gygax, Oakhill, & Garnham, 
2003; although see Sanford & Emmott, in press).
Comprehension of discourse is facilitated whilst in a congruent 
emotional state and inhibited whilst in an incongruent state. In 
one study, participants were asked to read sentences while holding 
a pen in their mouth (à la Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). 
Participants either held the pen with their teeth only, thus 
mimicking the expression of a smile, or with their lips only, which 
blocks a smiling expression. When sentences evoked valence 
congruent with the mimicked facial expression, processing time 
was faster than when wearing an incongruent facial expression 
(Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007). In a separate study, participants 
who had botulinum toxin-A (botox) injected in the muscles 
responsible for frowning, thus temporarily paralyzing them, 
showed increased reading times for negative sentences (Havas, 
Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010). These studies 
support a “simulation” or “embodied” account of language, 
whereby the same neural systems responsible for perception and 
action are invoked during language processing.
Of interest here is the proposal by Havas and colleagues that 
emotion simulation, unlike action simulation, doesn’t happen at 
the lexical level, but requires more linguistic material to occur. 
This seems at odds with other findings, suggesting immediate 
recruitment of emotion systems in language processing. 
Psycholinguistic studies show that people process language 
incrementally; they do not wait until the end of a sentence to 
process grammar and meaning, but build structures as language 
unfolds. According to a recent study, the affective component of 
words—as reflected in one’s value system, for example—
influences the earliest aspects of language processing, modulating 
how deeply meaning is processed (Van Berkum, Holleman, 
Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009). Members of a conservative 
Christian group, as well as non-Christians, were given sentences 
to read that were either congruent or incongruent with their moral 
value system, for example, I think euthanasia is an acceptable 
course of action. Van Berkum et al. (2009) found that, as soon as 
participants read a word that clashed with their beliefs (for the 
conservative Christian group the word acceptable in the example 
sentence), a neural signal, as measured by electroencephalography 
(EEG), indicated processing difficulty for the meaning of the 
word within that context and, moreover, additional resources 
were recruited to process the word subsequently. This suggests 
that even the earliest stages of language comprehension are 
sensitive to the emotional message of an utterance, especially 
when it is ego-threatening for the addressee.
In summary, it is likely that there are different processing 
streams for discourse about third parties, as depicted in narratives 
and literature, and discourse pertinent to one’s own values and 
beliefs. Future research will need to clarify the exact time-course 
of integration of information from descriptive emotional words 
versus affect-laden words into discourse. In addition, the 
specificity of emotional inferences when understanding motives 
and goals of characters needs to be further clarified. Finally, all 
these processes need to be understood in the context of the 
possible goals of the comprehender.
Conversation
Stories are encountered not only when reading, but also during 
conversation. There are some particularly interesting things to 
learn about emotion by studying them in the context of everyday 
conversation. For example, when a speaker is retelling an earlier 
episode that involved emotion, the reconstructed affect will differ 
in systematic ways from that which was experienced. More 
importantly, conversation provides the exact testing ground for 
evaluating claims about how emotion functions in everyday 
behavior, claims such as: “Many believe that characteristic 
expressions of basic emotions ‘erupt’ in speech, often involuntarily, 
as one of the neurophysiological consequences of experiencing the 
emotion by the ‘sender’ or encoder of the expression” (Pell, 
Paulmann, Dara, et al., 2009, p. 417).
Through studying everyday conversation as it occurs 
between friends, family, and colleagues, or in the context of 
service encounters between customers and service providers, 
conversation analysts have illustrated the elegant dance of 
emotional display and timing. In an analysis of surprise, for 
example, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2006) show that surprise 
tokens are not spontaneous, impulsive eruptions, but rather that 
“they are little performances of viscerality” (p. 161). Recipients 
delay surprise tokens and will withhold them over some time 
until the relevant place in the conversation opens up for their 
“eruption,” for instance, the ending of the speaker’s turn. 
Moreover, recipients “blurt out” a surprise response multiple 
times to the same surprise source, without the response losing 
its feeling of involuntariness and spontaneity. Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger argue that two people together produce surprise: One 
presents something surprising by highlighting the contrast 
between what might be expected to be the case and what actually 
happened, and the recipient produces the surprise reaction, 
conveying that they have understood that something unusual 
happened. The timing and sequence of these together “perform” 
surprise (see also Wilce, 2009).
In a cross-linguistic comparison, Couper-Kuhlen (2011) 
examined emotion in the context of requests. Asking something 
of someone can be perceived as a burden and the rejection of a 
request can be fraught. Couper-Kuhlen shows that both German 
and English requests follow parallel conversational trajectories, 
with similar types of emotion displays: disappointment and 
annoyance. According to her analysis, disappointment is part of 
the sadness family and is inward directed, whereas annoyance 
is part of the anger family and is associated with aggression and 
striking out. So, by displaying annoyance when a request is 
rejected, a speaker is implying that the rejecting party is at fault 
somehow, whereas by displaying disappointment, the speaker 
implies that the rejecting party can’t help it. Moreover, because 
displays of annoyance are not “pro-social,” they are dispreferred 
(see also Selting, 2010; Wiggins, 2002).
In summary, conversational data are a critical source of 
evidence for claims about emotion in its natural, ecological 
setting. The data presented earlier draw attention to the 
public aspects of emotion and language and suggest that 
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emotional displays are not just direct outpourings from private 
physiology.
Conclusion
This brief review demonstrates that emotion is, indeed, relevant 
to every dimension of language—from phonology to lexicon, 
grammar and discourse—emotional expression is finely tuned 
to language-specific structures.
Based on current emotion research in the language sciences, 
one could ask whether there are generalizations to be made 
about what types of emotional meaning appear where. Is it the 
case, for example, that phonology only conveys information 
about affect, while lexicon conveys discrete emotion and 
grammar expresses attitude? This partitioning is too simplistic. 
Hearers appear to decode discrete emotions from prosody; 
words carry connotative meaning as well as descriptive 
meanings, and attitude can be conveyed by units smaller than 
the sentence. Nevertheless, it may be that certain linguistic 
structures are more suited to conveying particular aspects of 
emotion. Future emotion research ought to continue to exploit 
cross-linguistic variation to explore this issue, and to unravel 
additional principles operating between language and emotion.
References
Alonso-Arbiol, I., Shaver, P., Fraley, R. C., Oronoz, B., Unzurrunzaga, 
E., & Urizar, R. (2006). Structure of the Basque emotion lexicon. 
Cognition & Emotion, 20, 836–865.
Ameka, F. (1992). Interjections: The universal yet neglected part of speech. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 18, 101–118.
Anolli, L., Wang, L., Mantovani, F., & De Toni, A. (2008). The voice of 
emotion in Chinese and Italian young adults. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 39, 565–598.
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs 
to become less American. American Psychologist, 63, 602–614.
Auracher, J., Albers, S., Zhai, Y., Gareeva, G., & Stavniychuk, T. (2010). 
P is for happiness, N is for sadness: Universals in sound iconicity to 
detect emotions in poetry. Discourse Processes, 48, 1–25.
Barrett, L. F., & Bliss-Moreau, E. (2009). Affect as a psychological 
primitive. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 41, pp. 167–218). Burlington, MA: Academic Press.
Barth-Weingarten, D., Reber, E., & Selting, M. (Eds.). (2010). Prosody in 
interaction. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company.
Bergen, B. K. (2004). The psychological reality of phonaesthemes. 
Language, 80, 290–311.
Besnier, N. (1990). Language and affect. Annual Review of Anthropology, 
19, 419–451.
Boster, J. S. (2005). Emotion categories across languages. In H. Cohen & 
C. Lefebvre (Eds.), Handbook of categorization in cognitive science 
(pp. 187–222). Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
Breugelmans, S. M., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2006). Emotion without a word: 
Shame and guilt among Rarámuri Indians and rural Javanese. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1111–1122.
Brown, R., & Fish, D. (1983). Are there universal schemas of psychological 
causality? Archives de Psychologie, 51, 145–153.
Burke, M. (2010). Literary reading, cognition and emotion: An exploration 
of the oceanic mind. London, UK: Routledge.
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Christiansen, M. H., & Chater, N. (2008). Language as shaped by the brain. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31, 489–509.
Christiansen, M. H., & Kirby, S. (Eds.). (2003). Language evolution. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Comrie, B. (1981). Language universals and linguistic typology. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Couper-Kuhlen, E. (2011). Affectivity in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural 
perspective. In T. Stehl (Ed.), Sprachen in mobilisierten Kulturen: Aspekte der 
Migrationslinguistik [Languages in mobilizing cultures: Linguistic aspects of 
migration] (pp. 231–257). Berlin, Germany: Universitätsverlag Potsdam.
Cruse, D. A. (1986). Lexical semantics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Cutler, A., Dahan, D., & Van Donselaar, W. (1997). Prosody in the 
comprehension of spoken language: A literature review. Language and 
speech, 40, 141–201.
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man. London, UK: John Murray.
Delancey, S. (1997). Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected 
information. Linguistic Typology, 1, 33–52.
Diffloth, G. (1972). Notes on expressive meaning. Chicago Linguistic 
Society, 8, 440–447.
Dingemanse, M. (2011). The meaning and use of ideophones in Siwu. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis). Radboud University, The Netherlands.
Dixon, R. M. W. (2006). Adjective classes in typological perspective. In 
R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.), Adjective classes: A cross-
linguistic typology (pp. 1–49). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dixon, R. M. W., & Aikhenvald, A. Y. (Eds.). (2006). Adjective classes: 
A cross-linguistic typology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dolscheid, S., Shayan, S., Majid, A., & Casasanto, D. (2011). The thickness 
of musical pitch: Psychophysical evidence for the Whorfian hypothesis. 
In L. Carlson, C. Hölscher & T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 537–542). 
Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Dunn, M., Greenhill, S. J., Levinson, S. C., & Gray, R. D. (2011). Evolved 
structure of language shows lineage-specific trends in word-order 
universals. Nature, 473, 79–82.
Eitan, Z., & Timmers, R. (2010). Beethoven’s last piano sonata and those 
who follow crocodiles: Cross-domain mappings of auditory pitch in a 
musical context. Cognition, 114, 405–422.
Enfield, N. J., & Wierzbicka, A. (Eds.). (2002). The body in description of 
emotion [Special issue]. Pragmatics & Cognition, 10, 1–24.
Evans, N., & Levinson, S. C. (2009). The myth of language universals: 
Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 32, 429–448.
Fetterman, A. K., Robinson, M. D., Gordon, R. D., & Elliot, A. J. (2011). 
Anger as seeing red. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 
311–316.
Fodor, J. A. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fónagy, I. (1961). Communication in poetry. Word, 17, 194–218.
Foroni, F., & Semin, G. R. (2009). Language that puts you in touch with 
your bodily feelings. Psychological Science, 20, 974 –980.
Friend, M. (2000). Developmental changes in sensitivity to vocal 
paralanguage. Developmental Science, 3, 148–162.
Geeraerts, D. (2006). Words and other wonders: Papers on lexical and 
semantic topics. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
Gernsbacher, M. A., Goldsmith, H. H., & Robertson, R. R. W. (1992). Do 
readers mentally represent characters’ emotional states? Cognition & 
Emotion, 6, 89–111.
Gobl, C., & Ní Chasaide, A. (2003). The role of voice quality in communicating 
emotion, mood and attitude. Speech Communication, 40, 189–212.
Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
Goodwin, M. H., & Goodwin, C. (2001). Emotion within situated activity. 
In A. Duranti (Ed.), Linguistic anthropology: A reader (pp. 239–257). 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
442 Emotion Review Vol. 4 No. 4
Gygax, P., Garnham, A., & Oakhill, J. (2004). Inferring characters’ 
emotional states: Can readers infer specific emotions? Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 19, 613–639.
Gygax, P., Oakhill, J., & Garnham, A. (2003). The representation of 
characters’ emotional responses: Do readers infer specific emotions? 
Cognition & Emotion, 17, 413–428.
Hagoort, P., & Van Berkum, J. (2007). Beyond the sentence given. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
362, 801–811.
Harkins, J., & Wierzbicka, A. (Eds.). (2001). Emotions in crosslinguistic 
perspective. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
Hasegawa, Y., & Hirose, Y. (2005). What the Japanese language tells 
us about the alleged Japanese relational self. Australian Journal of 
Linguistics, 25, 219–251. 
Haspelmath, M. (2001). Non-canonical marking of core arguments 
in European languages. In A. Y. Aikhenvald, R. M. W. Dixon & 
M. Onishi (Eds.), Non-canonical marking of subjects and objects  
(pp. 53–83). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., Gutowski, K. A., Lucarelli, M. J., & 
Davidson, R. J. (2010). Cosmetic use of botulinum toxin-A affects 
processing of emotional language. Psychological Science, 21, 
895–900.
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., & Rinck, M. (2007). Emotion simulation 
during language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 
436–441.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in 
the world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 1–75.
Hietanen, J. K., Leppänen, J. M., & Lehtonen, U. (2004). Perception of 
emotions in the hand movement quality of Finnish sign language. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 28, 53–64.
Hockett, C. F. (1960). The origin of speech. Scientific American, 203, 89–96.
Huang, S. (2002). Tsou is different: A cognitive perspective on language, 
emotion, and body. Cognitive Linguistics, 13, 167–186.
Imai, M., Kita, S., Nagumo, M., & Okada, H. (2008). Sound symbolism 
facilitates early verb learning. Cognition, 109, 54–65.
Iwasaki, N., Vinson, D. P., & Vigliocco, G. (2007a). What do English 
speakers know about gera-gera and yota-yota? A cross-linguistic 
investigation of mimetic words for laughing and walking. Japanese 
Language Education Around the Globe, 17, 53–78.
Iwasaki, N., Vinson, D., & Vigliocco, G. (2007b). How does it hurt, “kiri-
kiri” or “siku-siku”? Japanese mimetic words of pain perceived by 
Japanese speakers and English speakers. In M. Minami (Ed.), Applying 
theory and research to learning Japanese as a foreign language  
(pp. 2–19). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Jakobson, R. (1960). Linguistics and poetics. In T. Sebeok (Ed.), Style in 
language (pp. 350–377). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jespersen, O. (1922). Language: Its nature, development and origin. 
London, UK: G. Allen & Unwin.
King, K., & Melzi, G. (2004). Intimacy, imitation and language learning: 
Spanish diminutives in mother–child conversation. First Language, 24, 
241–261.
Klaiman, M. H. (1980). Bengali dative subjects. Lingua, 51, 275–295.
Kockelman, P. (2003). The meanings of interjections in Q’eqchi’ Maya: 
From emotive reaction to social and discursive action. Current 
Anthropology, 44, 467–490.
Kövecses, Z. (2003). Metaphor and emotion: Language, culture, and body 
in human feeling. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kulick, D., & Schieffelin, B. B. (2004). Language socialization. In 
A. Duranti (Ed.), A companion to linguistic anthropology (pp. 347–
368). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories 
reveal about the mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Landau, I. (2009). The locative syntax of experiencers (Vol. 53). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar: Theoretical 
prerequisites. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
le Guen, O. (2009). The ethnography of emotions: A field worker’s guide. 
In A. Majid (Ed.), Field manual (Vol. 12, pp. 31–34). Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands: Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Retrieved from 
http://fieldmanuals.mpi.nl/volumes/2009/ethnography-of-emotions/
Levinson, S. C. (2006). Parts of the body in Yélī Dnye, the Papuan language 
of Rossel Island. Language Sciences, 28, 221–240.
Lindholm, J. (1975). The conceptual basis of the Tamil adverbial participle. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis). University of Chicago, USA.
Lupyan, G., & Dale, R. (2010). Language structure is partly determined by 
social structure. PLoS ONE, 5, e8559.
Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics (Vol. 1). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.
Maddieson, I. (2011a). Consonant inventories. In M. S. Dryer & 
M. Haspelmath (Eds.), The world atlas of language structures online. 
Munich, Germany: Max Planck Digital Library. Retrieved from http://
wals.info/chapter/1
Maddieson, I. (2011b). Vowel quality inventories. In M. S. Dryer & 
M. Haspelmath (Eds.), The world atlas of language structures online. 
Munich, Germany: Max Planck Digital Library. Retrieved from http://
wals.info/chapter/1
Majid, A., Sanford, A. J., & Pickering, M. J. (2007). The linguistic description 
of minimal social scenarios affects the extent of causal inference making. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 918–932.
Masson, D. I. (1953). Vowel and consonant patterns in poetry. The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 12, 213–227.
McGuire, W. J. (1969). The nature of attitudes and attitude change. The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, 3, 136–314.
McIntosh, D. N., Zajonc, R. B., Vig, P. S., & Emerick, S. W. (1997). 
Facial movement, breathing, temperature, and affect: Implications of 
the vascular theory of emotional efference. Cognition & Emotion, 11, 
171–196.
Miall, D. S. (2001). Sounds of contrast: An empirical approach to phonemic 
iconicity. Poetics, 29, 55–70.
Moore, C. C., Romney, A. K., Hsia, T., & Rusch, C. D. (1999). The 
universality of the semantic structure of emotion terms: Methods for the 
study of inter- and intra-cultural variability. American Anthropologist, 
101, 529–546.
Nuckolls, J. B. (1999). The case for sound symbolism. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 28, 225–252.
Oatley, K. (1992). Best laid schemes: The psychology of emotions. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Oda, H. (2000). An embodied semantic mechanism for mimetic words in 
Japanese. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis). Indiana University, Bloomington, 
USA.
Ogarkova, A. (in press). Folk emotion concepts: Lexicalization of emotional 
experiences across languages and cultures. In J. Fontaine, K. R. Scherer 
& S. Soriano (Eds.), Components of emotional meaning: A sourcebook. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Onishi, M. (2001). Non-canonically marked subjects and objects: 
Parameters and properties. In A. Y. Aikhenvald, R. M. W. Dixon & 
M. Onishi (Eds.), Non-canonical marking of subjects and objects (pp. 
1–111). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Osaka, N., & Osaka, M. (2005). Striatal reward areas activated by implicit 
laughter induced by mimic words in humans: A functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study. NeuroReport, 16, 1621.
Pell, M. D., Monetta, L., Paulmann, S., & Kotz, S. A. (2009). Recognizing 
emotions in a foreign language. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 33, 
107–120.
Pell, M. D., Paulmann, S., Dara, C., Alasseri, A., & Kotz, S. A. (2009). 
Factors in the recognition of vocally expressed emotions: A comparison 
of four languages. Journal of Phonetics, 37, 417–435.
Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York, NY: Morrow & Co.
Majid Emotion in the Language Sciences 443
Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought: Language as a window into human 
nature. London, UK: Alan Lane.
Potts, C., Asudeh, A., Cable, S., Hara, Y., McCready, E., Alonso-Ovalle, L., 
. . . Walkow, M. (2009). Expressives and identity conditions. Linguistic 
Inquiry, 40, 356–366.
Pullum, G. K., & Rawlins, K. (2007). Argument or no argument? Linguistics 
and Philosophy, 30, 277–287.
Quam, C., & Swingley, D. (2012). Development in children’s interpretation 
of pitch cues to emotions. Child Development, 83, 246–250.
Reilly, J. S., Mcintire, M. L., & Seago, H. (1992). Affective prosody in 
American sign language. Sign Language Studies, 75, 113–128.
Roberson, D., Damjanovic, L., & Kikutani, M. (2010). Show and tell: The 
role of language in categorizing facial expression of emotion. Emotion 
Review, 2, 255–260.
Robinson, S. (2006). The phoneme inventory of the Aita dialect of Rotokas. 
Oceanic Linguistics, 45, 206–209.
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 39, 1161–1178.
Russell, J. A., Bachorowski, J. A., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2003). Facial 
and vocal expressions of emotion. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 
329–349.
Sanford, A. J., & Emmott, C. (in press). Mind, brain and narrative. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sauter, D. A., Eisner, F., Ekman, P., & Scott, S. K. (2010). Cross-cultural 
recognition of basic emotions through nonverbal emotional vocalizations. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 2408.
Sauter, D. A., LeGuen, O., & Haun, D. B. M. (2011). Categorical perception 
of emotional facial expressions does not require lexical categories. 
Emotion, 11, 1479–1483.
Scherer, K. R., Banse, R., & Wallbott, H. G. (2001). Emotion inferences 
from vocal expression correlate across languages and cultures. Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 76–92.
Scherer, K. R., Clark-Polner, E., & Mortillaro, M. (2011). In the eye of the 
beholder? Universality and cultural specificity in the expression and 
perception of emotion. International Journal of Psychology, 46, 401–435.
Selting, M. (2010). Affectivity in conversational storytelling: An analysis 
of displays of anger or indignation in complaint stories. Pragmatics, 
20, 229–277.
Semin, G. R., & Fiedler, K. (1988). The cognitive functions of linguistic 
categories in describing persons: Social cognition and language. 
Journal of Personality, 54, 558–568.
Sereno, J. A. (1994). Phonosyntactics. In L. Hinton, J. Nichols & J. J. Ohala 
(Eds.), Sound symbolism (pp. 263–275). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Shayan, S., Ozturk, O., & Sicoli, M. A. (2011). The thickness of pitch: 
Crossmodal metaphors in Farsi, Turkish, and Zapotec. The Senses and 
Society, 6, 96–105.
Shibatani, M. (1990). The languages of Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Sicoli, M. A. (2010). Shifting voices with participant roles: Voice qualities 
and speech registers in Mesoamerica. Language in Society, 39, 521–553.
Silverstein, M. (2001). The limits of awareness. In A. Duranti (Ed.), 
Linguistic anthropology: A reader (pp. 382–401). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing.
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating 
conditions of the human smile: A nonobtrusive test of the facial 
feedback hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
54, 768–777.
Taylor, I. K., & Taylor, M. M. (1965). Another look at phonetic symbolism. 
Psychological Bulletin, 64, 413–427.
Thompson, W. F., & Balkwill, L.-L. (2006). Decoding speech prosody in 
five languages. Semiotica, 158, 407–424.
Toivonen, R., Kivelä, M., Saramäki, J., Viinikainen, M., Vanhatalo, M., 
& Sams, M. (2012). Networks of emotion concepts. PLoS ONE, 7, 
e28883.
Trechter, S. (1999). Contextualizing the exotic few: Gender dichotomies 
in Lakhota. In M. Bucholtz, A. C. Liang & L. A. Sutton (Eds.), 
Reinventing identities: The gendered self in discourse (pp. 101–119). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Trudgill, P. (2011). Sociolinguistic typology: Social determinants of 
linguistic complexity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Tsur, R. (1992). What makes sound patterns expressive? The poetic mode of 
speech perception. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Van Berkum, J. J. A., Holleman, B., Nieuwland, M., Otten, M., & Murre, J. 
(2009). Right or wrong? The brain’s fast response to morally 
objectionable statements. Psychological Science, 20, 1092–1099.
Verhoeven, E. (2007). Experiential constructions in Yucatec Maya: 
A typologically based analysis of a functional domain in a Mayan 
language. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Von Essen, O. (1979). Allgemeine und angewandte Phonetik: mit 9 Tabellen 
[General and applied phonetics: With 9 tables]. Berlin, Germany: DDR.
Wharton, T. (2003). Interjections, language, and the showing/saying 
continuum. Pragmatics & Cognition, 11, 39–91.
Whissell, C. (1989). The dictionary of affect in language. In R. Plutchik & 
H. Kellerman (Ed.), Emotion: Theory, research, and experience (pp. 
113–131). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Whissell, C. (1999). Phonosymbolism and the emotional nature of sounds: 
Evidence of the preferential use of particular phonemes in texts of 
differing emotional tone. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 89, 19–48.
Whissell, C. (2003). The emotional symbolism of two English e-sounds: 
/I/ as in “cheap” is pleasant and /I/ as in “chip” active. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 96, 149–165.
Wierzbicka, A. (1988). The semantics of grammar. Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Wierzbicka, A. (1992). The semantics of interjection. Journal of Pragmatics, 
18, 159–192.
Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantics: Primes and universals. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.
Wierzbicka, A. (1999). Emotions across languages and cultures: Diversity 
and universals. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wierzbicka, A. (2009). Language and metalanguage: Key issues in emotion 
research. Emotion Review, 1, 3–14.
Wiggins, S. (2002). Talking with your mouth full: Gustatory mmms and the 
embodiment of pleasure. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 
35, 311–336.
Wilce, J. M. (2009). Language and emotion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wilkins, D. P. (1992). Interjections as deictics. Journal of Pragmatics, 18, 
119–158.
Wilkinson, S., & Kitzinger, C. (2006). Surprise as an interactional 
achievement: Reaction tokens in conversation. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 69, 150–182.
Wilkowski, B. M., Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D., Carter, M. S., & Feltman, 
R. (2009). “Hot-headed” is more than an expression: The embodied 
representation of anger in terms of heat. Emotion, 9, 464–477.
Yu, N. (2003). Metaphor, body, and culture: The Chinese understanding of 
gallbladder and courage. Metaphor and Symbol, 18, 13–31.
Zajonc, R. B., Murphy, S. T., & Inglehart, M. (1989). Feeling and facial 
efference: Implications of the vascular theory of emotion. Psychological 
Review, 96, 395–416.
Zwicky, A. M., Salus, P., Binnick, R. I., & Vanek, A. (Eds.) (1971). Studies 
out in left field: Defamatory essays presented to James D. McCawley 
on the occasion of his 33rd or 34th birthday. Edmonton, Canada: 
Linguistic Research.
